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•	 The	 territorial	 extensiveness	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 brings	 about	 an	
immense	diversity	 in	 terms	of	geographic,	economic	and	ethnic	 features	
of	 individual	 regions.	This	diversity	 is	 reflected	by	serious	disparities	 in	
the	regions’	levels	of	development,	as	well	as	their	national	identity,	civic	
awareness,	social	and	political	activity.	We	are	in	fact	dealing	with	a	‘mul-
ti-speed	 Russia’:	 along	 with	 the	 economically	 developed,	 post-industrial	
regions	 inhabited	by	active	communities,	 there	are	poverty-stricken,	 in-
ertial	regions,	dependent	on	support	and	subsidies	from	the	centre.	Large	
cities,	with	their	higher	 living	standards,	concentration	of	social	capital,	
a	 growing	 need	 for	 pluralism	 in	 politics	 and	 elections	 characterised	 by	







































tion	of	 large	 investments	 into	 their	 territory	 (such	as	 the	exploitation	of	















manoeuvre,	mainly	by	 imposing	 additional	financial	 burdens	 on	 the	 re-
gional	budgets.	Currently,	 two-thirds	of	the	regional	budget	are	running	
deficits,	and	the	regional	governments	have	difficulties	striking	a	balance	
























































The	 regional	 differentiation	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 and	 the	 relations	 be-
tween	the	capital	and	the	regions	are	often	treated	as	an	element	of	broader	
political	 and	 economic	 studies.	 However,	 they	 deserve	 separate	 analysis.	
Firstly,	the	country’s	great	geographic,	economic,	ethnic	and	social	diversity	
affects	the	direction	and	pace	of	development	of	the	entire	Russian	Federation,	











































sian	 regions	 by	 describing	 selected	 regions	 with	 distinctive	 characteristics	
(related	 to	 geography,	 resources,	 ethnic	 composition)	 and	 specific	 interests.	
The	fourth	chapter	analyses	the	stance	of	the	active	regions	towards	centrali-





































Their	 pursuit	 of	 greater	 autonomy	was	 not	 (as	 in	 developed	 countries	with	
a	federal	system)	synonymous	with	decentralisation	and	a	division	of	powers	































the	 capture	 of	 Kazan).	 The	most	 self-confident	 regions	 –	 Tatarstan	 and	 the	
Chechen-Ingush	republic	–	even	refused	to	sign	the	Federal	Treaty	in	1992	con-
cerning	 the	 division	 of	 powers	 between	 the	 centre	 and	 the	 regions3,	which	
they	 saw	 as	 confirmation	 of	 the	 regions’	 vulnerability	 vis-à-vis	 the	 centre.	















































































The	 process	 of	 harmonising regional laws with federal	 legislation was	
launched,	 including	the	removal	of	references	to	 ‘sovereignty’	 from	regional	
constitutions	 and	 laws,	 as	well	 as	 other	 provisions	 that	 contradicted	 feder-
al	norms.	Under	a	presidential	decree	of	 13	May	2000,	an	additional	 level	of	
administration	was	 introduced	which	was	not	 reflected	 in	 the	Constitution:	
along	with	 the	division	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 into	 ‘federal	 subjects’	 (re-
gions),	it	was	divided	into	seven	federal	districts.	These	are	headed	by	pleni-
potentiary	envoys,	official	representatives	of	the	president	whose	function	is	

























envoys	played	a	significant	role	 in	 limiting	the	autonomy	of	 the	regions	and	
subordinating	them	to	the	central	government.
The	centre	has	also	strengthened its control over the regional institutions 
of force;	 the	 right	 to	appoint	heads	of	 their	 regional	 structures	has	become	
the	exclusive	prerogative	of	the	president	of	the	Russian	Federation.	In	2002,	
the	regional leaders lost their senatorial status;	they	had	to	leave	the	Fed-
eration	Council,	 the	upper	house	of	parliament,	 thus	 losing	influence	on	the	
legislative	process	at	 the	federal	 level.	 Instead,	 they	became	members	of	 the	






al	elites	was	the	president’s	initiative	in	2005	to	replace general elections to 











































procedure	of	 their	appointment	by	 the	Kremlin	reduced the independence 
and effectiveness of the regional authorities.	Their	priorities	have	shifted	
from	concentration	on	the	region	and	the	interests	of	regional	actors	towards	
seeking	the	Kremlin’s	favour,	whose	will	determined	the	position	of	the	head	
of	 the	region.	This	model	 is	not	conducive	 to	 increasing	the	efficiency	of	re-













This	 model	 promotes	 an	 attitude of the regions as passive supplicants,	
wherein	it	 is	easier	to	seek	donations	from	the	centre	than	to	create	favour-
able	conditions	 in	 the	regions	 themselves	 to	develop	and	 invest	 in	new	pro-
























use of their natural potential	 and	 to	profit	 from	 their	 competitive	advan-
tages.	In	2004	the	regional	governments	lost	their	leverage	on	the	investment	
policy	 concerning	 the	 extraction	 of	 natural	 resources	 on	 their	 territories:	
the	extraction	licenses	are	now	issued	by	the	federal	Ministry	of	Natural	Re-
sources.	Nor	do	the	regions	have	any	impact	on	the	policies	of	corporations	that	
carry	out	mining	work	on	 their	 territories:	most	of	 the	 large	companies	are	
registered	in	Moscow,	where	they	pay	taxes	and	negotiate	the	terms	of	their	
activities.	 It	 is	also	up	 to	 the	 federal	authorities	 to	grant	 tax	reliefs	 to	 those	
companies,	which	lowers	the	tax	revenues	of	the	regional	budgets	and	reduces	
the	regions’	income.
Instead,	 the	 Kremlin	 often	 offers	 the	 regions	 projects that do not quite 
match their needs and specificity.	An	example	of	 this	 is	 the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast,	 a	 Russian	 exclave	within	 the	 European	Union.	 A	 Special	 Economic	
Zone	 in	 force	 in	 that	 region	 from	 1996	 to	 2006	was	 conducive	 to	 small	 and	
medium-sized	investors,	including	from	abroad.	When	it	expired,	the	federal	
parliament	passed	 a	new	 law	on	 a	 Special	 Economic	Zone,	which	 this	 time	
promotes	 large	 investors	 (with	 investments	 exceeding	 $5	million).	The	new	
zone	has	attracted	only	a	few	dozen	investors,	while	the	majority	of	foreign	
companies	 have	withdrawn	 from	Kaliningrad:	 the	 overall	 number	 of	 com-
panies	with	foreign	capital	has	decreased	fourfold16.	Moscow’s	other	‘flagship	








16	 J.	 Rogoża,	A.	Wierzbowska,	 I.	Wiśniewska,	 ‘A	 captive	 island:	Kaliningrad	 between	Mos-





































iii. A MuLti-speed russiA
The	territorial	extensiveness	of	 the	Russian	Federation	results	 in	an	unusu-












characterisation	 of	 the	 remaining	 federal	 subjects	 –	 the	more	 passive	 ones,	
that	lack	a	clear	identity,	characteristics	and	resources,	but	which	neverthe-
less	have	a	numerical	superiority	among	the	Russian	Federation	regions.	
One	area	that	stands	out	due	to	 its	economic potential	 (mainly	raw	mate-
rial	resources)	is	Siberia19,	which	is	the	natural	resource	base	of	Russia	–	it	
holds	 the	 largest	natural	 gas	 reserves	 and	 the	 third-largest	 oil	 reserves	 in	
the	world,	huge	forest	areas	and	drinking-water	reservoirs20.	The	relation-
ship	between	the	Russian	capital	and	this	region	can	be	described	as	quasi-






































social	 facilities.	Also,	 the	Siberian	 transport	 system	 is	designed	 to	 a	much	





















that	Siberia	earns	enough	 for	Russia,	and	so	 the	greater	part	of	 these	 funds	
should	remain	in	the	region	and	be	directed	not	only	to	current	social	needs,	
but	also	 to	 investments	 in	 the	region’s	development.	Pointing	 to	 the	region’s	

















desire	 to	profit	 from	 its	vicinity	 to	 the	 rapidly	developing	areas	of	Asia	 and	
the	Pacific,	Uss	has	repeated	Peter	the	Great’s	call	to	 ‘cut	a	window’	not	only	
through	to	Europe	but	also	to	Asia25.



















Caucasus	 republics),	 from	which	 it	 derives	 its	 identity	 and	 cultural	 distinc-
tiveness,	is	tatarstan,	located	in	the	Volga	region.	Tatars	prevail	in	the	ethnic	
structure	of	 the	republic	 (they	make	up	53.2%	of	 the	population,	while	Rus-
sians	 are	 39.7%)28.	 Ethnic	 issues	 are	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 policy	 pur-
sued	by	 the	region’s	government.	 In	recent	years	 the	so-called	 ‘Tatarisation’	
of	the	republic’s	administration	has	been	noted,	as	initiated	by	the	President	
of	Tatarstan	Rustam	Minnikhanov,	who	replaced	the	republic’s	long-standing	


























the influence of islam	is	strong	in	the	republic,	and	is	considered	as	one	of	
the	main	distinctions	of	Tatars’	national	 identity.	A	 large	part	of	 the	Tatars	
are	Muslim	 (Sunni),	 but	 their	 exact	number	 is	difficult	 to	 calculate,	 as	 cen-

















































leads	them	to	act	in	defence of their national autonomy	(Tatarstan	defends	
the	teaching	of	Tatar	language	in	its	schools,	despite	protests	by	the	Russian-
speaking	population32)	and	their	interpretation of history.	Tatars	have	suc-





























































































Economic	Zone,	which	would	 consider	 support	 for	 small	 and	medium-sized	
enterprises	 (see	 section	 2).	A	 barrier	 to	 the	 region’s	 attractiveness	 to	 inves-
tors	is	the	extensive areas of restricted access:	foreigners	are	not	admitted	
to	a	5-kilometer	border	zone	and	other	areas	covering	a	total	of	a	third	of	the	
oblast’s	territory39.	At	the	same	time,	the	local	elites	are	aware	that	they	owe	




programs40.	On	 the	other	hand,	despite	 the	endorsement	of	 the	 federal	pro-
gramme	for	the	Kaliningrad	oblast	by	2015,	with	planned	investments	amount-
ing	to	$600	million,	no	funds	have	reached	the	region	so	far.















41	 As	 ascertained	 by	 the	 Federal	 Anti-Monopoly	 Service,	 50%	 of	 income	 from	 fishing	 goes	
to	the	grey	zone,	and	the	price	of	fish	has	been	inflated	several	 times.	Y.	Skrynnik,	 ‘FAS	
gluboko	nyrnula’,	Vedomosti,	20	April	2011.


















sale	 and	 service	 of	 cars,	 and	 the	 clothing	 trade)	 and	horizontal	 business	net-
works.	The	residents	of	 the	region	have	repeatedly	demonstrated	 their	deter-












































among	the	regions	with	the	lowest election results for Vladimir putin and 
the ‘party of power’, united russia44.
Finally,	a	special	place	on	the	map	of	Russia	is	reserved	for	Moscow,	which	is	
a	centre	of	disproportionately high concentration of capital and human 
resources,	but	also	a	spot	with	a	specific	social	and	political	culture,	clearly	
different	from	the	rest	of	Russia.	Moscow,	especially	within	the	limits	of	the	


















tions for systemic changes;	 for	pluralism	in	 the	economy	and	politics;	and	
for	 a	 democratic	 alternative	 to	 the	 current	 government.	 These	 new	 habits	
have	started	to	affect	the	political	sphere.	So	far,	the	most	tangible	results	of	





























The	 abovementioned	 regions	 are	 in	 the	 vanguard	 of	 those	 Russian	 regions	
























gent	and	 inertial	ones	are	uninterested in expanding their autonomy,	 as	
it	would	involve	the	necessity	of	independently	searching	for	new	sources	of	



































once	 again	 showed	how much the individual regional societies differ in 









































from	 the	 Krasnoyarsk	 krai)	 and	 governors	 with	 a	 democratic	 background	
(such	as	Nikita	Bielykh,	the	leader	of	the	Kirov	oblast).	Sometimes	the	regions’	
dissent	was	not	directly	expressed	by	the	local	elites,	but	by	affiliated	political	


































efficiency of the Kremlin’s ‘electoral machine’,	which	is	based	on	regional	













































intervention).	 In	 2013,	 this	 trend	 continued;	 several candidates from ‘out-






exchanges between the parties have intensified,	some	members	of	the	re-
gional	nomenklatura	have	changed	parties,	and	the	entire	process	has	been	ac-









•	 the regional elites’ limited instruments of influence on the centre.	
While	the	Kremlin	has	extensive	instruments	of	pressure	on	the	regions,	
50	 Civil	 Initiatives	 Committee	 report,	 14	August	 2013,	 http://komitetgi.ru/analytics/788/	 #.	





























some	 concessions	 or	 increased	 funding.	One	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 2010	






























































V. MonocentrisM striKes BAcK
Vladimir	Putin’s	return	to	the	Kremlin	in	May	2012	was	a	turning	point	that	
separated	the	more	liberal	(in	form)	rule	of	President	Medvedev	from	another	






The	 attempt	 to	 strengthen	 control	 over	 the	 regions	 and	 over	 the	 entire	 do-
mestic	policy	has	entailed	personnel changes and the reorganisation	of	the	




















has	been	marginalised,	 and	many	of	 them	have	been	replaced54.	 In	2012	 the	
52	 For	 details	 see	 Administratsiya	 Prezidenta	 zavershila	 reformu	 upravleniya	 vnutrenney	
politiki,	http://www.lenta.ru,	15	March	2012.
53	 M.	Tirmaste,	‘V	regiony	spustili	vnutrennuyu	politiku’,	Kommersant,	4	June	2012.














were	 considered	 ineffective	 (such	as	 the	governors	of	 the	Stavropol	 and	Za-











restoration of formal democratic procedures,	and	on	the	other	hand,	it	in-
troduces	rigorous	methods	of	control	over	those	new	procedures,	which	dis-
torts	their	impact	almost	completely.	As	a	result,	the	concessions introduced 
by Moscow appear to be just an empty gesture.	The	decentralisation	and	the	
transfer	of	some	competences	 to	 the	regional	 level,	as	announced	by	 former	








































ed	by	the	Kremlin:	regional elites seek the support of the Kremlin	to	a	far	
greater	degree	than	the	support	of	regional	groups	and	societies.	At	the	same	
time,	it	almost	completely	wrecks	any	real	political	competition	at	the	regional	
level57.	As	a	result,	in most cases the ‘new’ practice of electing regional gov-












































regional	elections	 for	 the	second	Sunday	of	September	–	on	 the	one	hand,	 it	




Another	formal	tool	 to	control	 the	regions	 is	 the	expanded mechanism for 
verifying	the	regional	elites’	work.	Under	Vladimir	Putin’s	decree	of	January	
2013,	the	procedure	of	the	governors’	dismissal	was	extended;	the	right	to	de-
mand	 this	dismissal	was	granted	 to	 federal	 government	ministers,	who	are	










centre	 (including	 the	unregulated	principles	of	migration,	 and	an	extensive	
grey	zone	of	illegal	migrant	labour).
In	the	economic	sphere,	Moscow’s	strategy	towards	the	regions	is	based	on	in-
creasing their socio-economic obligations,	a	move	which	has	shaken the 
stability of their budget systems	and	reinforced the model of ‘direct con-
























budgets	more	 than	 doubled	 in	 2013,	 reaching	 $22	 billion;	 two-thirds of re-
gional budgets currently have a deficit61.	This	trend	will	continue	in	2014;	
the	cost	of	 salary	 increases	 for	public	 sector	employees	 for	 regional	budgets	
will	rise	by	7%,	and	in	some	regions	by	up	to	10%.	The	regions’	income	has	ad-
ditionally	been	reduced	by	the	central	authorities’	tax	policy;	the	centre	grants	





them	for	current	liabilities,	while	a	great deal of investments, including in 
infrastructure, have been cut.	This	problem	now	concerns	not	only	the	least	
developed	regions,	but	also	the	industrialised	ones,	such	as	the	Chelyabinsk,	
Sverdlovsk	and	Irkutsk	oblasts.	The	deterioration	of	the	financial	situation	in	













The	 central	 authorities	 are	 seeking	 to	maintain	 their	 control	 over	 regional	
spending,	and	assign	financial	aid	in	the	form	of	subsidies	for	specific	purpos-
es,	such	as	the	implementation	of	federal	target	programs,	specialised	medi-






















centre	 are	 far	 from	 transparent,	which	 reinforces	 the	arbitrary nature of 
Moscow’s support for the regional budgets.
Along	with	its	legislative	tools,	the	Kremlin	has	a	wide	range	of	instruments	
for	 putting	 informal pressure	 on	 regional	 governors	 or	 city	mayors,	 such	
as	 involving	 the	 institutions of force	 or	wielding	corruption allegations.	
The	campaign	of	harassment	against	officials	and	(also	regional)	politicians,	
intended	 to	 discipline	 them	 and	 conducted	 under	 anti-corruption	 banners,	


















manoeuvre	in	the	financial	sphere.	This	intensifies	bilateral pressure on re-
gional elites who	have	increasing	difficulties	balancing	between	the	demands	
of	 the	centre	and	 the	growing	dissatisfaction	of	 regional	businesses	and	so-
cieties	(whose	social	situation	is	deteriorating).	While	in	the	short	term,	this	
‘grip’	weakens	the	assertiveness	of	regional	elites	and	forces	them	to	be	loyal	
to	 the	Kremlin,	 in	 the	 long	 run	 the	policy	of	hyper-centralisation	 increases	
the	risk	of	rising	discontent,	which	may	quickly	find	a	vent	if	the	central	gov-

































Vi. prospects: decentrALisAtion AHeAd  
(But WHAt Kind oF decentrALisAtion?)
Due	to	Russia’s	legal	and	institutional	weaknesses,	the	relations	between	the	
centre	and	the	regions	are	only	governed	by	the	constitution	and	formal	laws	











mutable,	permanent	and	final	either;	and	the	key factor that could initiate 
change is the situation in the ruling camp of the federal elite.






will	 impose	 spending	cuts	at	both	 federal	 and	 regional	 levels64.	Other	prob-
lems	include	the	deteriorating	effectiveness	of	management	and	rampant	cor-
ruption,	which	makes the russian economy extremely capital-intensive;	
even	the	current	high	prices	of	raw	materials	are	no	 longer	sufficient	 to	en-
sure	Russia	an	adequate	GDP	growth65.	These	economic	problems	may	result	






65	 In	 2013,	 the	 average	 annual	 price	 of	 a	 barrel	 of	 Urals	 oil	 amounted	 to	 US$105,	 and	 GDP	




















The	weakening of the ruling elite’s	 legitimacy is	 another	key	 factor	 that	




















The	 prospects	 of	 the	 central	 government	weakening	 are	 likely	 to	 intensify	
the	efforts	of	the	regions	–	especially	the	more	affluent	ones,	with	a	distinc-
tive	 character	and	greater	ambitions	–	 to	modify	 the	current	model	of	 rela-
tions,	which	they	consider	unjust	and	unfavourable	to	their	development.	The	
turning	point	may	come	when	the	weakness	or	ineffectiveness	of	the	central	


































ing	 (the	hyper-centralisation	policy	has	only	deepened	 the	 incapacitation	of	
regional	 elites	by	 the	 centre).	At	present,	 in	most	 regions	one	may	question	
the	very	existence	of	regional	‘elites’	in	the	full	sense	of	the	word66.	Moreover,	
most	regions	lack	real	separation	of	powers,	developed	societies	and	institu-
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Cities of federal importance
Moscow – 1
St. Petersburg – 2
AUTONOMOUS OKRUGS
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – 3
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug – 4
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 5
Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 6
AUTONOMOUS OBLASTS
Jewish Autonomous Oblast – 7
KRAIS
Altai Krai – 8
Khabarovsk Krai – 9
Kamchatka Krai – 10
Krasnodar Krai – 11
Krasnoyarsk Krai – 12
Primorsky Krai – 13
Perm Krai – 14
Stavropol Krai – 15
Zabaykalsky Krai – 16
REPUBLICS
Republic of Adygea – 17
Republic of Altai – 18
Republic of Bashkortostan – 19
Republic of Buryatia – 20
Republic of Khakassia – 21
Chechen Republic – 22
Chuvash Republic – 23
Republic of Dagestan – 24
Republic of Ingushetia – 25
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) – 26
Kabardino-Balkar Republic – 27
Republic of Kalmykia – 28
Karachay-Cherkess Republic – 29
Republic of Karelia – 30
Komi Republic – 31
Republic of Mari El – 32
Republic of Mordovia – 33
Republic of North Ossetia – 34
Republic of Tatarstan – 35
Republic of Tuva – 36
Udmurt Republic – 37
OBLASTS
Amur Oblast – 38
Arkhangelsk Oblast – 39
Astrakhan Oblast – 40
Belgorod Oblast – 41
Bryansk Oblast – 42
Chelyabinsk Oblast – 43
Irkutsk Oblast – 44
Ivanovo Oblast – 45
Yaroslavl Oblast – 46
Kaliningrad Oblast – 47
Kaluga Oblast – 48
Kemerovo Oblast – 49
Kirov Oblast – 50
Kostroma Oblast – 51
Kurgan Oblast – 52
Kursk Oblast – 53
Leningrad Oblast – 54
Lipetsk Oblast – 55
Magadan Oblast – 56
Moscow Oblast – 57
Murmansk Oblast – 58
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast – 59
Novgorod Oblast – 60
Novosibirsk Oblast – 61
Omsk Oblast – 62
Orenburg Oblast – 63
Orel Oblast – 64
Penza Oblast – 65
Pskov Oblast – 66
Ryazan Oblast – 67
Rostov Oblast – 68
Sakhalin Oblast – 69
Samara Oblast – 70
Saratov Oblast – 71
Smolensk Oblast – 72
Sverdlovsk Oblast – 73
Tambov Oblast – 74
Tyumen Oblast – 75
Tomsk Oblast – 76
Tula Oblast – 77
Tver Oblast – 78
Ulyanovsk Oblast – 79
Vladimir Oblast – 80
Volgograd Oblast – 81
Vologda Oblast – 82
Voronezh Oblast – 83
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Penza Oblast – 65
Pskov Oblast – 66
Ryazan Oblast – 67
Rostov Oblast – 68
Sakhalin Oblast – 69
Samara Oblast – 70
Saratov Oblast – 71
Smolensk Oblast – 72
Sverdlovsk Oblast – 73
Tambov Oblast – 74
Tyumen Oblast – 75
Tomsk Oblast – 76
Tula Oblast – 77
Tver Oblast – 78
Ulyanovsk Oblast – 79
Vladimir Oblast – 80
Volgograd Oblast – 81
Vologda Oblast – 82
Voronezh Oblast – 83
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